Recently, Yang et al. (Quantum Inf Process:17:129, 2018) proposed a secure multiparty quantum summation protocol allowing the involved participants to sum their secrets privately. They claimed that the proposed protocol can prevent each participant's secret from being known by others. However, this study shows that the participant who prepares the initial quantum states can obtain other participants' secrets with an inverse quantum Fourier transform attack. A modification is then proposed here to solve this problem.
Introduction
The task of secure multi-party quantum summation (SMQS) is helping the involved participants to obtain the summation of their secrets, and at the same time, the participants' secrets can be kept in privacy. In 2007, Du et al. [1] designed an SMQS protocol based on single photons. Then, to improve the efficiency of Du et al.'s SMQS protocol, Chen et al. [2] designed an efficient SMQS protocol with GHZ states, Zhang et al. [3] proposed a high-capacity SMQS protocol where both of the polarization and the spatial-mode degrees of freedom are used. In addition, several other SMQS protocols have been proposed [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
Recently, Yang et al. [9] proposed an SMQS protocol based on quantum Fourier transform and claimed that their protocol can avoid both of the outside attacks and the inside attacks. However, this study shows that the participant who generates the initial particles can use an inverse quantum Fourier transform attack to obtain other participants' secrets. Then, a simple solution is hence proposed here. 
Brief review of Yang et al.'s SMQS protocol [9]
Before reviewing Yang et al.'s SMQS protocol, it is necessary to briefly introduce some background first.
Background
In 
Yang et al.'s SMQS protocol
Suppose that there are n participants   1 2 , , , n P P P who want to obtain the summation of their private integer strings. Let i P 's private integer string is 
Attack and modification on Yang et al.'s SMQS protocol
Yang et al. [9] . Then, to solve this problem, a modification is proposed.
The Inverse Quantum Fourier Transform Attack
In Step 2, the participants just use decoy particles to check whether there is an eavesdropper in the particle transmission processes, but do not check the correctness of the initial states  used is based on [10] . The modified version is as follows.
Step 1* Step 1* are the same as the Step 1 in Section 2.
Step 2* (the same as Step 2 in Section 2.)
Step 3* For checking the correctness of the initial states , all the measurement results will be the same. Hence, if all the corresponding measurement results are correct, they discard these checking states and continue 7 the next step. Otherwise, they abort this protocol.
Step 4* and Step 5* are the same as Step 3 and Step 4 in Section 2, respectively.
With this checking process, the participants can ensure that the shared initial states are 12 n a a a  [10] . Hence, the inverse quantum Fourier transform attack mentioned earlier can be avoided.
Conclusions
Yang et al. proposed an SMQS protocol based on quantum Fourier transform operation.
However, this study points out a loophole in the protocol. With the loophole, a malicious participant 1 P may obtain other participants' private integer strings with an inverse quantum Fourier transform attack. An improvement is hence proposed to avoid this loophole.
